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ABSTRACT

The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, enacted by the Trump administration, created the largest
government-sponsored subsidy for urban renewal through the Opportunity Zones program. This
tax expenditure is designed to delay and even avoid capital gains taxes to incentivize
development in areas deemed to be in economic distress. While the program’s stated intent is to
revitalize neighborhoods, build a ordable housing, or promote small businesses, the selection of
qualified areas is based on the income rate of residents. That is to say, a subsidy program focused
on the physical place improvements has based its designation criteria on local resident’s income.
While little academic scholarship has focused on this revolutionary program yet, this note finds
that the Opportunity Zone approach to urban renewal likely furthers gentrification, is ripe for
abuse, and lacks specificity to help the communities it is intended to serve. These statutory e ects
are seen clearly in a case study of the Opportunity Zones in Charlottesville, Virginia. In particular,
the selection of Zones shows ability to manipulate the program to inappropriately subsidize
already-occurring development. In response to the structural issues and the results from the
Charlottesville case study, this note further provides a framework of policy solutions for state and
local governments, as well as stakeholders, to utilize the opportunity for investment dollars while
mitigating the negative externalities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The much-touted Opportunity Zones arising from the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has resulted
in a flurry of activity among investment bankers, real estate professionals, and capital asset
holders. Designed to “encourage economic growth and investment in designated distressed
communities,” Opportunity Zones create a capital gains tax benefit for taxpayers who invest
into funds that are designed to pour money into low-income communities.1 Such communities
are chosen through a somewhat complex process involving criteria designed for another
similar federal tax benefit aimed at providing low-income housing. However, some report that

the criteria is so broad as to allow up to 57% of America to qualify for the low-income census
tract status, despite not truly constituting “distressed communities” as the act intends to
assist. Generally, Opportunity Zones are perceived to be an incredible asset for investors but
pose potentially severe harms for the low-income communities they are designed to help. This
program has attracted much attention from the business sector as representing an
unprecedented tax cut for wealthy investors but has been little addressed by the academic
community.
This note argues that Opportunity Zones potentially exhibit a number of negative externalities
and that the Charlottesville case study lends credence to arguments that these areas
exacerbate gentrification. Primarily, a lack of relation between the location criteria and the
intended benefits as well as an absence of limitations to guide investment in distressed
communities weaken the program’s e ectiveness. That is to say, as the largest tax expenditure
focusing on urban renewal and the largest urban renewal program of the decade it should
include very specific criteria to ensure the investments truly accomplish the stated purpose
instead of harm the low-income communities the program is geared to benefit. Secondarily,
Opportunity Zones are an ine icient place-based subsidy that circumvent local institutional
knowledge by incentivizing outside development instead of encouraging local participation in
community-betterment. But, practically speaking, changing this approach to tax policies has
significant hurdles. Within this structure, this note argues that state and local leaders, in
addition to stakeholders, can implement strategies to ensure the Opportunity Zone Funds
invest in ways that benefit local residents.
Part II of this note details the structure of Opportunity Zones, the policy rationales behind their
creation, and their perceived weaknesses. Part III suggests stronger state and local
government, in addition to community-based, solutions to prevent gentrification and other
detrimental e ects stemming from the current structure of Opportunity Zones. Similarly, it
suggests mitigation tactics that capitalize on the federal government’s expenditures to benefit
the local community. Part IV contains a case study on a specific locality, Charlottesville, Virginia
and focuses in evaluating their Zone selections—which indicate previously existing
development—and suggesting future actions to prevent any negative e ects on the
community-at-large. This section also applies the local government and stakeholder solutions
to determine validity of these mitigation tactics.

II. PLACE-BASED AND UPSIDE-DOWN SUBSIDY
WEAKNESSES
A. STRUCTURE
The Opportunity Zone legislation is conceptually attributable to England’s “enterprise zones.”
When brought to the U.S., Republican Congressman Jack Kemp envisioned the program as a
way to revitalize urban areas. In the 1990s, amid attempt to pass this as national legislation,
geographer Doreen Massey said, “the main impact of the zones will be spatially redistributive—
that they will lead to a shi ing around of jobs, but not to the creation of new ones.”2 By this, he
meant that new jobs created in the area likely would lead to the moving of jobs from other
areas which might or might not result in a net good.3 This criticism survives today. Opportunity
Zones are also an incarnation of the subset of tax policies targeted at specific localities instead
of people. This program, along with many other federal incentives to invest in low-income
areas arose as the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) repealed certain
rules designed to prevent gentrification, notably the one-for-one replacement rule, which
forced developers to provide new housing to those displaced by urban renewal.4 Thus,
scholars identify place-based tax policies like the Opportunity Zone program as having roots in
“subsidiz[ing] gentrification,” through laissez-faire government policies.5 That is to say, the
government views these expenditures as a successful way to incentivize private industry to
fulfill what many perceive as traditional responsibilities of government.
Like its predecessors, Opportunity Zones are structured to funnel capital into certain census
tracts that satisfy selective criteria designed to target low-income communities for
revitalization. That is, the program bases selections of the Zones on people’s income but strives
to improve the physical landscape. While selection is ostensibly designed to improve
community member’s situations, the program does not address this disconnect.
According to the relevant tax code, a “Qualified Opportunity Zone” is defined as “a population
census tract that is a low-income community” and so designated by the Treasury.6 The
designation arises by the “chief executive o icer of the state,” usually the governor, notifying
the Secretary of Treasury of the desired tract within the state and the Secretary certifying such
nomination.7 “Low-income community” is defined in another section of the tax code originally
dra ed as guidelines for the New Markets Tax Credit, another place-based subsidy. Lowincome community means census tracts that have at least a twenty percent poverty rate.

Alternatively, in the case of non-urban areas, the census tract qualifies if median family income
does not exceed eighty percent of the “statewide median family income.” Likewise, in the case
of an urban area, it is also eligible if median family income does not exceed eighty percent of
the “metropolitan area median family income.”8 Also, contiguous tracts are eligible “if their
median family income does not exceed 125% of the adjacent qualifying low-income
community tract.”9 That is to say, the program is designed to include nearby tracts that are not
as distressed but perhaps should be combined for logistical or other purposes.
In the end, 42,176 census tracts were selected for Opportunity Zone designation with 2.6% of
the chosen tracts being contiguous.10 The Urban Institute, a think tank in Washington, D.C.,
evaluated the investment scores for all designated tracts including measuring on a scale 1-10
the amount of pre-existing investment in each state’s selections. Virginia scored on the higher
end of preexisting development with a score just under 6.11 The worst o enders include
Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, Vermont, and West Virginia with scores between 6 and 7.12 The
states with the lowest preexisting investment are Montana, Alaska, and Georgia, as well as
DC.13 The Urban Institute also evaluated the Zones by comparing preexisting socioeconomic
changes. In Virginia, 4.2% of selected Opportunity Zones already had high levels of
socioeconomic change.14 While discouraging, it is much lower than states such as New York
where 13% of their Zones are already experiencing socioeconomic changes.15 This factor is
particularly relevant in evaluating the e iciency and accuracy of selected Zones as the stated
purpose of the tax expenditure is essentially to create socioeconomic changes by altering the
physical landscape. Thus, preexisting changes indicate an ine icient subsidization of activities
that would have occurred without such an expense.
In the most simplistic terms, taxpayers’ capital gains tax liability is reduced when the gains
from a sale or transfer are invested in qualified Opportunity Zones. If the funds are le in an
Opportunity Fund for 10-years, then the gains will not be taxed. The taxpayer has a 180-day
period from the date of sale to invest the gains or any portion thereof from a capital gains
realization event into an Opportunity Fund, excluding the invested portion from that year’s
gross taxable income and deferring gain.16 For a simplified example, should a taxpayer sell
stock for $2,000 that they purchased for $1,000, they have 180-days to invest the gain into an
Opportunity Fund and avoid including the $1,000 gain in their gross-annual-income. Should
the money be kept in the Opportunity Fund for five years, the taxpayer enjoys a step up in basis
by 10% and, at seven years, the basis increases an additional 5%.17 A er being held in the fund
for 10 years, the basis is stepped up to the fair market value (FMV) of the asset on the day it was

sold or exchanged.18 This step up in basis to FMV is another way of saying the appreciation in
value or the gain the taxpayer has experienced in the asset (from the original sale) will never be
taxed. Any “step up” in basis reduces the portion of the gain potentially subject to tax if the
money is not le in the fund for the full vesting period. While appearing technical, this is an
extraordinarily favorable tax benefit, especially for investors with significant potential capital
gains. Prior to this program there was no comparable way to avoid capital gain inclusion.19
The Funds themselves can be structured in numerous ways, including as a corporation or
partnership.20 Proposed Treasury regulations promulgated in April of 2019 added more clarity
to how the Funds should interact with the Opportunity Zones (which was a common question
at the outset due to vagueness of the relevant code sections). Per the statute, Funds must
retain 90% of their assets within Opportunity Zones as measured on the last day of the 6month interval and the final day of the taxable year for the fund.21 This typically means June
30th and December 31st. The test is “applied by using asset values as reported on an audited
financial statement or by using the asset cost if no such financial statement is available.”22
However, there was a point of confusion created by the requirement that “substantially all” of a
business’ assets must be within the Zone to qualify as an “Opportunity Zone Business” (or, to
be one of the assets includable in the fund’s 90% retention requirement). This particular
question only refers to a two-tiered structured fund where the qualified Opportunity Fund
invests 90% of their assets into a Qualified Business (or multiple businesses). This concept is
represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1.23

As diagramed above, the Qualified Business itself is required to have “substantially all” of their
assets within the zone. The Regulations served to clarify that “substantially all” was designed
to require 70% of the property to be within the zone at the times of accounting.24 This could
allow businesses to take advantage of the gains but invest at least part of their property in
other localities. To summarize, a one-tier structure must have 90% of their assets within the
zone. A two-tiered structure must have 90% of their assets, which are Qualified Businesses,
within the zone. However, the Qualified Business is only required to leave 70% of their assets
within the Zone. Though it is outside the scope of this note, it is notable that there are concerns
of fraudulent dealing regarding the corporate structure.
A final point concerned with the structure of the program is that reporting requirements were
not included in the tax code. Therefore, at present, there is not a feasible way to track
investments being made nationally, how much gain is being deferred, or what exactly is being
invested in by Opportunity Funds.25 There have been some moves to change this structure.
Most notably, in November of 2019, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), introduced a bill requiring
annual reporting from the Funds, strengthening some regulations regarding what types of
investments can be made, and reducing the number of Zones by excluding those deemed to
not be truly low-income.26

B. CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIZATIONS
The first and easiest way to conceptually structure the Opportunity Zone program is to think of
it in terms of tax expenditures. Tax expenditures are defined as “provisions of the federal tax
laws in which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”27 More generally,
tax expenditures designate an area the federal government gives some sort of tax benefit to in
order to incentivize behavior, costing revenue to the government itself. Examples of such
programs include the mortgage interest deduction, the earned-income tax credit, and the
deduction for medical insurance provided to employers. Tax professor Ruth Mason argues,
“[t]he federal government uses tax expenditures to regulate, including in areas traditionally
reserved to the states.”28 Economically, these expenditures function the same as direct
government spending, but they are significantly less visible to the public.29 However, Professor
Mason goes on to argue that the lack of visibility should not change the federalism concerns
given the federal government regulating areas traditionally reserved for the states.30
Federalism concerns notwithstanding, unique to tax expenditures is the idea that states can
“claw back” the incentive. That is to say, states can tax the exact area the federal expenditure is
providing tax savings on and “theoretically . . . completely repeal the federal . . . deduction for
their own residents,” without implicating preemption in the same way might regulating direct
aid programs.31
Tax expenditures’ greatest strength is likely the very factor that poses federalism concerns,
decreased visibility. In theory, such a policy allows the government to funnel robust resources
into a community without facing political pushback that is traditionally associated with direct
aid programs. Direct aid programs usually function with recipients applying and perhaps
interviewing to receive the benefit.32 Tax expenditures remove the regulatory impediments
and psychological costs but accomplish the same goal, theoretically.33
Second and more generally, this program can be described as an upside-down subsidy in that
it has a stated goal to help low-income areas by assisting low-income people, but the benefit of
the program economically flows to wealthy taxpayers. Although statistics vary as to who
benefits from capital gains cuts, one set of researchers found that only 18% of U.S. households
have unrealized capital gain.34 Another way of stating this phenomena is that the tax incidence,

or that of “who bear[s] the burden of a tax or enjoy[s] the benefit of the tax preference,” is not
who the tax is intended to help.35 Simply, the program ensures that non-impoverished, and
likely wealthy, taxpayers see a benefit in their capital gains treatment with the hope that
investors provide some sort of benefit to low-income residents in the qualified census tracts.
Logically, this fits into the neoliberal “trickle down” policies dominating U.S. economics in
recent decades, but ignores volumes of criticism related to this conception of capitalism.
This program has attracted significant attention from political forces and the business
community. State legislatures see this as an opportunity to encourage investment in their cities
and the business community recognizes a significant financial benefit. For example, the
Wisconsin legislature introduced a bill in September of 2019 that would grant an additional
10% capital gains tax reduction for investors who hold the majority of their investments in the
qualified funds within the state for five years.36 This is an incredible windfall considering the
federal Opportunity Zone program alone is estimated to cost the federal government 9.4 billion
in lost revenue by 2022.37 Clearly the program has massive benefits for investors, so additional
state funds targeted at the same goal, without any additional requirements to encourage the
money to be invested in projects that fit a state-goal like a ordable housing, indicates just how
strong the political ideological support is, despite ine iciency of additional monetary
incentives. That is to say, the need for additional state incentives shows that the lack of criteria
at the federal level creates systematic ine iciencies as the states expend more funds than
necessary to direct the investment towards desirable ends. To simplify, the federal structure
simultaneously subsidizes development that likely would already occur, creating ine iciencies
at the state level requiring more subsidization than should be necessary to encourage the
originally conceptualized development.
In part due to the program’s size and but also in response to media accusations of wrongdoing,
six democrats sitting on the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Oversight Committee requested a report from the Government Accountability o ice (GAO).
Interestingly, one of the requesting senators included Cory Booker, who was an initial cosponsor of the Opportunity Zone Bill.38 The most recent move for accountability may be in
response to a New York Times article accusing Treasury Secretary Mnuchin of instructing that
certain land in Nevada be deemed an Opportunity Zone to benefit a long-time friend, Michael
Milken, the inspiration for Gordon Gecko in the blockbuster movie “Wall Street.” The article
linked an internal memo that listed the many reasons this particular area should not be an
Opportunity Zone, including that designating Zones that do not meet the legislatively

mandated criteria is unfair to other states, risks the legitimacy of the program, and creates
issue with the designation of powers between the IRS and Treasury.39 Milken holds significant
real estate holdings that would benefit from this particular tract being designated and there is
a claim that his business partner heavily lobbied Treasury to change the area’s classification to
benefit a 700-acre development site.40 Both Milken, a spokesman for his institute, and
Secretary Mnuchin deny that there was any collusion here to personally benefit Milken.41
However this particular designation occurred, it rea irms stakeholder’s fears that Opportunity
Zones may not be utilized to truly benefit low-income areas and their residents and have at
least the potential to be manipulated by lobbyists or powerful private interests.

C. POLICY RATIONALES
Opportunity Zones, like most tax expenditures, have strong bipartisan support. Specifically,
the Opportunity Zone initiative was presented and supported by Republican Senator Tim
Scott, aforementioned Democratic Senator Cory Booker, Republican Representative Pat Tiberi,
and Democratic Representative Ron Kind.42 For republicans, programs like this “leverage[e]
modest federal investments to drive private capital into communities that have been sidelined
as our national economy booms.”43 This approach allows the market to influence and manage
what is a politically desirable end of revitalizing urban areas. Alternatively, progressive groups
tend to see this as a way to drive capital towards impoverished areas without experiencing
political pushback to direct aid programs or encountering welfare stigma. Additionally, while it
may not be an ideal structure, this program at least drives some federal funds to help income
impoverished areas and people.44 Despite this rhetoric, it is notable that terms such as
“revitalization” and “renewal” o en are used to hide the policy goal of gentrification by
couching the same activities in socially permissible terminology.45 It is not clear that this
program would have achieved the support it has if gentrification was an openly stated policy
goal making the utilized justifications suspicious. That is to say, if the hope is to accomplish
poverty relief, this is more than likely an ine icient tax expenditure as it is not accomplishing
what a direct expenditure might.46
The 2015 white paper that originally proposed the Opportunity Zones program attributed its
motivation to the fact that income discrepancy was exacerbated or tied to localities.47 The
authors conceptualized city devolution as a cycle of losing industry revenues creating a “falling
tax base” and reduced money for infrastructure. Simply they explain, “capital liquidity

constraints both drive and are driven by a lack of public infrastructure, resulting in an
equilibrium characterized by decay.”48[7] Theoretically, incentivizing the return of private
investment will break the cycle and assist community members who refuse to leave their
failing cities.49 Interestingly, the authors recognized that previous, similarly-structured
programs such as Empowerment Zones and the New Market Tax Credit have not been
successful. They attribute those failures to complicatedness of the process for accessing the
gain and weak or misaligned incentives to accomplish the stated goals.50 The idea that prior
programs have been extraordinarily complicated and therefore limit the pool of investors to
the highly sophisticated and resource-rich is non-controversial. However, the idea that
removing guardrails on investment to attract additional capital creates more tailored results is
curious. The authors argue that employment subsidies (in addition to asset purchase subsidies
and capital investment incentives) are mistaken as they are an “indirect method” to revitalizing
a city.51 More logically, they point out that employment subsidies are likely poorly structured in
that the benefit is greater for the employer if they hire multiple part-time workers than one full
time worker.52 However, this isn’t a general problem with incentivizing investment but one of a
lack of standards for how the benefit is to be accessed within the structure.
Additionally, the authors argue that limits on the size of investment discourage resource-rich
entrants that might otherwise create a large boon for the community.53 The authors do not
clarify how resource-rich entrants are both discouraged from using the prior programs but
simultaneously the only ones who can access the benefit due to the complex tax incentive
structure. The clearest policy rationales provided in this original conception of Opportunity
Zones are to simplify the tax program, reduce administrative costs for entrants, and avoid the
burdensome application process to a regulatory agency who grants access to the benefit.
However, the reasoning why this structure will produce more e icient or fair results is unclear.
The unsupported claim is that problems attributable to prior-tax programs do not arise from
the structure of Opportunity Zone programs because the money is restricted to specific goals.

D. PERCEIVED WEAKNESSES
Before conducting a case study or discussing solutions, it is helpful to provide a brief overview
of certain conceptual structures that sort and explain the Opportunity Zone program’s tax
structure. Michelle Layser, a tax professor at University of Illinois, is one of the few academics
to dedicate research to place-based tax subsidies; therefore, her structural conceptualizations

will be particularly analyzed, critiqued, and utilized to conceptually sort the benefits and
detriments to a program such as Opportunity Zones.

I. TAX CATEGORIZATIONS
Outside of the tax expenditure structure and conceptual moorings of the Opportunity Zone
program, there are numerous ways of categorizing tax policies in order to evaluate their
strengths and weaknesses. Important to this discussion is the comparison between placebased and people-based policies. Place-based policies view community through the lens of
“spatially-defined arrangements” whereas people-based policies tend to focus on common
interests, relationships, and the like.54 Simply, place-based policies are spatially motived and
consequently fund their programs through spatial investment while people-based programs
fund the targeted people-group more directly. The Opportunity Zone legislation is place-based
as it is not structured to include safeguards that ensure the investment aids the most
financially distressed people within the designated census tract nor are the funds distributed
directly to community members. Instead, the sole qualification for the benefit to the investor is
tied to a pre-determined boundary of land. Housing vouchers are an example of a peoplebased program where the direct benefit of the expenditure of federal funds, their incidence,
directly falls on the targeted audience.
Professor Layser has argued that place-based tax policies can be explained along two axes. The
first is to distinguish between direct and indirect tax subsidies. She explains that a direct tax
subsidy provides the benefit to businesses within the community versus that an indirect policy
provides benefits to outside, third-party investors. Second, she would distinguish the policies
between spatially-oriented and community-oriented policies. Spatially oriented tax policy
targets investments to low-income areas specific to preselected “spatial boundaries.” For
example, the Opportunity Zone program expressly flows investment funds into communities
experiencing economic distress. By contrast, a community-oriented policy looks to how the
community will be impacted by the investments and structures the investment to accomplish a
stated goal for the target community.55 This conceptualization is useful to summarize and
explains some of the program’s most serious critiques.

1. PLACE-BASED VS. PEOPLE-BASED

Opportunity Zones fall squarely within the spatially-oriented, indirect tax incentive
categorizations because the program provides “tax breaks directly to third-party investors who
invest in entities that, in turn, invest in low-income areas for the purpose of improving the
economic or built environment.”56 This program subsidizes third-party investors with the
ultimate goal of subsidizing businesses that engage with low-income communities,” instead of
directly aiding the community.57 This, and like programs, shi decision-making to the private
market and relieve the government of part of its duties to assist in equal opportunities for all
people.58 Predictably, shi ing social policy to the private market creates significant problems,
distorting the results and struggling to accurately accomplish stated goals. Though there is a
non-negligible benefit to delaying a tax, the total incidence of the tax benefit occurs a er a
fairly significant holding period so naturally the majority of investments themselves need to be
financially sound and profitable during this waiting period. The incentive structure to thirdparty investors has little to do with benefiting the community. Instead, it focuses almost
entirely on investors choosing the least risky investment that will produce a sizeable return.
Usually, that will lead a rational economic actor to look for already gentrifying areas and to
fund projects with high return on investment. For instance, rapidly gentrifying areas present
low-entrance costs but potential for large gains over the 10-year holding period. In other
words, choosing areas with rising home values or real estate trends will increase the investor’s
financial gain and minimize risk but reduce the correlated benefit to the low-income residents
of that neighborhood.59
It is noteworthy that not all scholars place weight in the place versus people distinction. Some
have argued that every policy that a ects place also creates a Tiebotian response of the sorting
of people.60 Charles Tiebout’s consumer-voter argument, later encompassed in the well-known
“home voter” terminology of William Fischel, argues that consumers move to communities in
perfect response to what a local government provides.61 That is, as a city (or neighborhood in
this case) changes, people will sort themselves out based on their preferences to local
amenities, including physical landscape, taxes, and services. If indeed such a policy causatively
a ects people sorting, subsidized investment in gentrifying areas will speed up an already
occurring process and displace the low-income residents the plan intends to assist.62
Summarily, “[p]eople move or stay where they are based in no small measure on opportunity,
so changing places changes the structure of choice.”63 In that way, place-based policies have a
direct e ect on people who live in the targeted area. However true this critique of tax
categorizations may be, it does not alter the analysis of how the community is impacted
through these programs. Instead, it strengthens the idea that the Opportunity Zone
expenditure forces out local residents responding to gentrification. Arguably, the thesis that

urban revitalization causes the improvement of physical space, thereby increasing the desire
for outsiders to move there is questionable, but, if it is indeed true, it is a polite way to point
out the true results stemming from place-based incentives. That is to say, this form of urban
investment may naturally lead to the exclusion of the very people it is designed to help
because of the focus on urban spatial improvement which may incentivize outsiders to move in
and price-out existing residents.
The New York Times issued a scathing report detailing current investment that is far from
benefiting impoverished residents. For instance, luxury apartment towers that include yoga
lawns and pools are being built in one Houston neighborhood where multiple developments
designed for the wealthy are already in the building process.64 That is not to say there are not
productive developments happening, though they are in the minority.65 For instance, a
developer in Birmingham is building apartments for the local work force and Goldman Sachs is
working to build mixed-income housing in various cities including Salt Lake. The president of
the Economic Innovation Group (the group that authored the initial white pages discussed
above theorizing Opportunity Zones) remarked that “(t)he early wave, that’s not what you
judge.”66 In theory, this seems to imply the intended development will occur later, perhaps
when the program is better-known. How time will necessarily change the current incentive
structure is unknown. Why initial investments primarily into luxury apartment buildings and
shopping centers does not indicate a failure of the program to provide the anticipated benefits
to low-income communities is far from clear. Perhaps there is a value in incentivizing rampant
and unchecked development regardless of displacement; however, this was not the stated
intent of the program and there is no data to suggest this creates an overall public good instead
of completing Massey’s prediction of resource sorting. To rephrase, this idea can also be
articulated as a policy that only creates urban renewal, thereby putting a paint of coat on
poverty, but fails to resolve any of the root causes that stagnate low-income areas.67

2. TAX EQUITY MODEL VS. FUND MODEL

Finally, Professor Layser’s distinguishes between the tax equity model and the fund model
implicated in the structure of tax expenditures related to housing and low-income benefit
programs. The tax equity model refers to “tax credits that are monetized through transactions
with third-party investors in low-income communities.”68 That is, the tax credit is likely sizeable
and covers a significant portion of the project’s cost, but the taxpayer has to “buy” the tax
credit a er completing the initial investment. In practice, third-party investors “purchase” the

credits and invest in the area proportionate to their tax relief. Examples of such programs
include the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC).69 In
comparison, the fund model instead provides deductions or exemptions from taxable gains
“with respect to money or property used to help finance businesses that invest in low-income
areas.”70 In the case of development, both programs allow a builder to access some of the
value now and complete a project despite the fact that the investors receive the ultimate
benefit at a later date.71
The same incentive is true of both models, that of encouraging investment in low-income
areas. But the fund model allows the benefit to be readily accessible to an investor when they
contribute to the fund.72 In other words, they receive the time value of their money as they
have a quasi-deduction at year one despite the criteria requiring the money to remain within
the fund for the minimum set time period, 5 years. Even should they withdraw the money and
lose the ultimate tax break, not paying tax in year one allows the money to be reinvested and
grow, even if the investor ends up paying tax in say, year three. The fund model is also a
particularly strong structure to encourage group investment from a variety of investors, not just
investments from banks which is more common under the tax equity system.73 Specifically,
allowing the pooling of resources gives investors with less resources a greater capacity to
participate in the program than an equity-model that is not naturally inclined to implement
joint investments.
While there are benefits to both models, the tax equity model is uniquely advantageous in that
it does not tie the investment to the project’s success. That is to say, from the investor’s
perspective, it matters little whether the project succeeds as they receive their tax benefit
merely from giving the money and the owners of the investment project retain the risk. Though
a successful investment is still preferable, the benefit is more immediate thereby lowering the
overall incentive to invest carefully in the longterm. Conversely, in the fund model, there is a
significant incentive to choose projects that will generate profit as the investors and fund
managers must sustain the project until the ultimate tax benefit appears many years later,
meaning that the investment must be successful enough to retain its viability for the 10-year
period.74 Though the current exclusion from tax is beneficial, the taxpayer is incentivized to
make money in the 10-year waiting period and ensure their gains are still in the Opportunity
Zone Funds to withdraw once the relevant accounting dates pass.

III. A CASE STUDY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE

Figure 2. Map from Novogradac.75

A. CASE STUDY
A case study of Charlottesville’s Opportunity Zones reveals ine iciencies in Zone selection and
the manipulability of data. This study also reveals the strengths and weaknesses of available
mitigation tactics to local legislatures and stakeholders. Notably, the only requirement in
selecting these Zones is that the poverty rate must exceed 20% or alternatively concerning

urban areas (relevant to this study) the tract may qualify if the median family income for the
tract does not exceed 80% of the median income of metropolitan area.76 This study attempts to
aggregate other available indicators not expressly required to determine how accurate the
poverty rate alone might be at selecting truly impoverished areas in need, specifically, of
development or renewal. Another thing to note at the outset is that the statute required the
governor to select the Zones, but it is highly unlikely this was done without the localities input.
This process is rather opaque with the only evidence as to how it worked being within a press
release from Governor Northam’s o ice. The press release said the Virginia Department of
Housing and Community Development coordinated with the Virginia Economic Development
Partnership to evaluate feedback “received… from localities throughout the Commonwealth in
order to recognize the needs and opportunities at the level of government closest to investors
and residents.”77 These agencies were intended to “‘focus on local, regional and state priorities
and ensure a strategic mix of zones with di erent types of revitalization needs and
development opportunities for potential investors.’”78
In Charlottesville, there are three Opportunity Zones located in somewhat curious parts of the
city and county at large. At the outset, it is important to note that a significant portion of the
Charlottesville population are students. While none of the selected Zones are well-known
student areas, a student’s lack of income does distort census findings.
The first Zone (Zone A) is located in the county and both includes and is adjacent to a
significant business district best known for a nearby failing mall and an upscale shopping
center, Stonefield.79 While these businesses may not be as successful as the city would like,
governor, or the federal legislature who set up the program standards, would likely be hard
pressed to say the residents of this stretch of land are specifically low-income compared to
other areas. In fact, the poverty rate is 14%, the lowest of the census tracts selected within
Charlottesville and below the 20% requirement (see Table 1). This indicates the area instead
utilized the provision allowing for selection if the median income is not above 80% of the
metropolitan area. Zone A has a fairly high median family income of $59,931 compared to the
Charlottesville metropolitan family median income of $76,173. This calculates to Zone A having
78.6% of the surrounding metro’s median income, just barely meeting the requirement.80 Zone
A also has 0% unemployment (see Table 1). This leads to two critiques. First, it is not entirely
clear there is a benefit to choosing such a tract when there could be more overall need in other
parts of the city. Secondly, it is strongly predicted this specific area will struggle to attract
development that will assist the residents it is intended to reach. That is, because this tract

includes business area with significant shopping and retail space, it is likely that investment
money will first and foremost seek opportunities there. It is also likely that a ordable housing,
for instance, will be significantly less profitable than building a store or restaurant. The loose
requirements of the program will be ine icient to constrain the economic desires of the
investors. Therefore, though this tract cannot be classified as totally outside the definition of
Opportunity Zones, it illustrates some of the inconsistencies with tying an urban development
program to the poverty of people. That is, it might revitalize or assist the physical landscape
but have no measurable benefit for the people themselves. Which is not to say there are not
needy people within this Zone but instead that the true motivations likely behind its selection
are not focused on them.
The second district (Zone B) sits to the southwest of the Downtown Mall and Belmont
neighborhood. Avon Street sits to the east and 5th street to the west of the Zone.81 This zone
encompasses two census tracts that will be analyzed separately though forming the same
general conclusion. Tract 1 (census tract 5.01) has the highest percentage of income spent on
rent of all the Charlottesville Opportunity Zones at 49.7% of renters paying rent over 35% of
their income. This is indicative of a lack of a ordable housing exacerbating poverty levels. The
poverty rate of the area is 24% and there is 7% unemployment (See Table 1).This tract also has
the lowest median family income of Opportunity Zones within Charlottesville at $31,853 (See
Table 1).

Table 1.82

Similarly, Tract 2 (census tract 4.01), had the second highest rent to income discrepancy
compared to Tract 1 at 42.6% of area residents spending over 35% of their income on rent.
Oddly, the area has, simultaneously, the highest rates of homeownership compared to the
other Zones at 42% (See Table 1). The poverty rate is also slightly higher than Tract 1 (See Table
1). To explain these discrepancies, the poverty percentage (See Table 1) and housing prices (See
Table 3) paint a picture of income disparity. The greatest percentage of owner-occupied homes
in this area range in value from $200,000 to $500,000 (See Table 3). This is hypothesized to
represent a discrepancy of incomes within the tract itself. Interestingly, Tract 1 and 2 have
almost the same number of residents and the percentage of white residents below the poverty
line is nearly the same. However, 48.5% of the black population of Tract 2 is impoverished
compared to 28.2% of Tract 1’s black population.83[1] Notably, there is a significantly higher
black population in Tract 1. In combination, Zone B is more deserving of the program’s
incentive development than Zone A because of the greater quantity of poverty, less business

development to distract investment dollars, higher unemployment rates, and an overall
picture of impoverished people living in the area.

Table 2.84

The last zone (Zone C) centers on the intersection of 5th Street and Old Lynchburg Road, just to
the south of the Fry Springs neighborhood. The Oak Hill Neighborhood is encompassed in the
Zone with the two nearby parks, Azalea Park and Biscuit Run State Park being mostly
excluded.85 Zone C is perhaps the most interesting and aptly designated Opportunity Zone in
Charlottesville’. It has the highest poverty rate in comparison to the other census tracts at 35%
but also one of the highest median incomes at $48,558 (See Table 1). Though what is most
interesting about this area is the peculiar average housing prices in comparison to the other
tracts. Zone B is the only census tract with a significant portion of housing valued at less than
$50,000 (See Table 3). This is hypothesized to result from Southwood Estates Mobile Home Park
being located at the bottom tip of the zone’s boundaries. Finally, Zone C is also the only
Opportunity Zone with more impoverished white residents than black.

Table 3.86

Interestingly, the Southwood Mobile Home Park is one of the only examples nationally of a
positive Opportunity Zone investment parcel. Habitat for Humanity purchased Southwood in
2007 with the intent of replicating what they had done at Sunrise—another trailer park in
Charlottesville.87 That is, they intended to convert the park into mixed-income housing without
displacing the existing residents. At Sunrise, they invested $20 million in repairs before
beginning discussions about transforming the space. Notably, the process relied substantially
on the residents themselves creating the plan for the new community. Now, at Southwood,
they plan on building over 400 a ordable housing units and 400 market rate units. This project
will combine Habitat for Humanity’s development resources and private developers’
capabilities by soliciting Opportunity Zone funds.88 While the development has not begun,
reports say that Opportunity Zone funding has already allowed for upgrades on the existing
plan.89
In conclusion, Zone C best illustrates a tract that has both statistical data to prove poverty,
income disparity, and a need for funds, but also possesses the right set of physical factors to

make development incentives a productive exercise. Because of the existence of Southwood,
with the helping hands of Habitat for Humanity, investment can be funneled in a way that
improves not only the physical landscape but also the lives of residents within the census tract.
The takeaways from this experiment are namely that data can be manipulated and
misinterpreted. Also, the data alone does not paint a clear picture of the tract and certainly the
required criteria, that of the poverty level, far oversimplifies an area’s needs. The program and
decision makers surely included other criteria in making these choices as evidenced by the
inclusion the business district within Zone A. Because the Opportunity Zones program is so
simplistic, there is a lack of transparency in what data is actually considered which is
problematic in terms of accountability but also conforming implementation across states or
even cities within a single state. While the Zones have already been selected, this critique may
prove useful in amendments or future iterations of place-based programs. A lack of criteria in
the selection of the “places” themselves, even disregarding the lack of specificity of
investment, is incredibly problematic.

IV. MITIGATION TACTICS
State and local legislatures, in partnership with community stakeholders, have significant
power to limit the negative impact of Opportunity Zones. Recognizing the inherent strengths
and flaws in the conceptual structure and actual implementation of Opportunity Zones, as well
as place-based tax expenditures more generally, raises the normative questions of what can be
done? As a political matter, the bipartisan support these programs have achieved is a nonnegligible benefit. Proposing an eradication of these types of programs in favor of direct aid, or
even more simply, tax programs with greater safeguards, is a rational response. However, such
a suggestion ignores that there are ways to accomplish a positive result within the existing
program. That is to say, if the federal government is willing to forgo billions of dollars in e orts
to help municipalities, the city and state legislatures, in combination with community leaders,
should find a way to capitalize on this.
State legislatures and governors have an obvious power to exercise over the Zones. First, the
governors selected the Zones and proposed them to Treasury, so they have already influenced
this process heavily. Secondly, the benefit of a tax expenditure is that state legislatures (or city

legislatures) have almost unparalleled ability to regulate without federal preemption issues
precisely because the federal government is expressly not regulating or taxing this sector. As
evidenced already, states can utilize the excitement of Opportunity Zones by creating further
incentives for useful development, that of investment that accomplishes a legitimate goal for
the benefit of the community members. They also have the capacity to ban certain forms of
investment that may pose larger externalities or are not helpful to the census tracts in
question.
Just as the state and local governments have potential solutions to take advantage of the
federal funds for the benefit of their communities, community leaders and stakeholders have
great potential to direct investment in a more productive way. Such possibilities range from
legal, contractual solutions to partnering with the legislatures and Opportunity Zones
themselves to provide valuable local knowledge.

A. SELECTION OF ZONES
States had significant ability to prioritize truly distressed neighborhoods but at least seven
states chose tracts that “had lower poverty and child-poverty rates, were better educated,
where incomes were rising faster, and where home values were higher than the low-income
areas they skipped over.”90 Allowing states to choose their Zones was an appropriate
delegation of power as they have the best perspective on what areas need the most
investment. They can consequently limit the negative e ects of this program by specifically
selecting areas that are not gentrifying. They can holistically review and exclude some areas
that may qualify as low-income but instead simply have a large percentage of college students
or the elderly skewing the results. That is to say, localities can help prevent the selection of
Zones that are likely to experience investment regardless of the program’s incentive.
The overall reviews of state’s e iciency in selecting Zones is disputed. The New York Times
reported, “(t)he federal government is subsidizing luxury developments—o en within walking
distance of economically distressed communities—that were in the works before Mr. Trump
was even elected president.”91 That is to say, not only is selecting census tracts where
development is already occurring an ine icient expenditure of funds, it also hurts nearby
struggling communities. For example, one Opportunity Zone in Portland, Oregon is expected to

raise $150 million to build a 35-story tower with a Ritz-Carlton hotel, o ice space, and condos
priced at up to $7.5 million apiece.92
The academic community is skeptical but less dire. One scholar reported that states picked
“relatively disadvantaged areas—having higher poverty rates, larger minority populations, and
lower educational attainment.”93 However, a study by the Urban Institute concluded that
“tracts with high rates of socioeconomic change were disproportionately represented in
selected Opportunity Zone tracts.”94 Governors have completed their selection processes and
cannot retroactively de-designate Zones at this time; however, they can utilize better data and
stakeholder wisdom when designating future Zones. Additionally, Republican Senator Tim
Scott is reportedly considering a bill that would allow a change to a small portion of selected
tracts. Senator Scott suggests that this would “redo some of the bad decisions,” in selecting the
Zones.95 Should this come to fruition, governors have significant opportunities to better their
choices.

B. PROVIDE TRANSPARENCY, MONITORING, EARNING, AND EVALUATION
Though a federal bill requiring transparency and reporting exists in an infancy stage, it is
unclear how much support it will garner with big businesses’ interests at stake.96 Either way,
states can minimize this gap in protection by requiring reporting of development within their
state.97 Likely the most successful monitoring programs would tie an additional state tax
benefit to reporting requirements, though this could be structured in numerous ways. An
additional tax benefit e ectively incentivizes reporting without creating potential litigation
claims for restricting development unfairly. Professor Layser suggests that just as community
involvement is necessary to the planning for development, likewise it is “essential for
monitoring outcomes.”98 She continues, “(t)he metrics for evaluating the impact of the law
should be clearly defined, and an assessment schedule should be set.”99 Layser advocates for
community involvement specifically because traditional criteria such as “property values,
employment rates, area poverty rate, or the amount of capital investments” tell evaluators
useful information about the development but do not necessarily answer the more holistic
question of the e icacy toward goal attainment.100 This note would add that without reporting
requirements it is infeasible to comprehensively review how this program is functioning. It
seems untenable to forgo so much revenue without being able to determine the expenditure’s
validity.

C. ACCOMPLISH STATE POLICY BY UTILIZING STATE LAND
Researchers at the Urban Institut have recommended many of these strategies but notably,
have raised the idea of using state land to subsidize development within Opportunity Zones. In
practice, this would have the state sell land at a discounted rate to a developer with the
promise that a certain type of development that is amenable to the community needs will be
implemented.101 The Institute provides Massachusetts as an example where the state policy
encourages converting “brownfield sites (such as landfills)” into “brightfields” or areas that
encourage solar panel installations.102 Clean energy is one example of this approach. Likewise,
a ordable housing, business sectors that are needed by community residents, vocational
training, and local business investment services are other examples of appropriate state
intervention.
While this likely will create a successful result in terms of incentivized and directed investment,
this suggestion is not to argue that this is perfectly e icient. Rather, this creates huge boons for
developers to fix the inadequate protections provided in the first place by the federal code
structure. So, while this can direct the aid e ectively, it is an example of overextending
resources to confer the intended benefit.

D. LAND USE CONTROLS AND STATE ACTION
Outside of selecting Zones, local legislatures and zoning boards (depending on the state’s
structure) have significant power to influence land uses within their locality. That is to say,
local legislatures can exercise at least some control over what development enters their cities
either by denying or fast-tracking any application for variances, rezoning, and other land use
applications. Most states have allowed significant local power in making choices and the courts
have frequently upheld that. In a post- Kelo v. City of New London103 world, localities have legal
backing to base their land use decisions on economic revitalization. Though Kelo was centrally
concerned with using eminent domain to take private property for economic development, it
a irms the broad base of authority for local decision-making regarding the economic needs of
their city.104

Utilizing land use controls e ectively might include a local zoning board pushing through plans
for a ordable housing faster than say, a golf course. In order to e ectuate this e iciently and
quickly, it may be useful for the localities themselves to amend their comprehensive plans to
prioritize certain forms of development in their designated Opportunity Zones. This could also
mean the locality disallows certain forms of zoning or imposes other restrictions to dissuade
developers from building luxury projects.

E. UTILIZE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS
Local stakeholders should always be included in the decision-making process for
investment.105 That is to say, stakeholders with knowledge of the community can be of great
aid in selecting projects that will serve the community and be profitable for the investors.106
Such a solution likely produces wiser investments and greater community acceptance of the
new capital flowing into their neighborhoods. However, it is less clear how to compel
investment funds to find local stakeholders and consult them on the fund’s plans. Perhaps this
idea works best when stakeholders aggressively solicit capital, so they are involved from the
initial decision-making.107 Alternatively, the governor can facilitate these relationships by
working with the community and asking what they see their local needs to be. In this way, the
governor can serve as a “matchmaker.”108 Some states, like New Jersey and Colorado, are
already accomplishing this through grants for “project-feasibility studies, requests for
proposals, investment memoranda and marketing, or legal/accounting support on specific
projects.”109 Florida has proposed an Opportunity Zone Commission to aid in these
attempts.110 Likewise, D.C. has established an “OZ Community Corps” to “provide pro bono
legal advice to residents and existing businesses in its Opportunity Zones to help projects in
those Zones benefit people already living and working there.”111
Utilizing the community in these discussions helps to mitigate results of a long-standing
practice of a top-down approach where architects and planners create spaces that they view as
superior but that do not suit community needs.112 In this sense, Professor Edward De Barbieri
has advocated for “urban anticipatory governance” where land use decisions are first
presented to residents for feedback before being implemented.113

F. COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENTS
Another solution is Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs). CBAs o er a unique way for local
advocates to circumvent the limitations of local government to force this tax subsidy to benefit
the community itself instead of just the investors. CBAs are structured as contracts entered
between community leaders and an incoming business or investment entity that create some
sort of regulatory benefit for the community.114 Such an agreement might include
requirements for local hiring, minimum wages, a ordable housing, relocation funding, and
limits on activities that may not be in the community’s interest.115 For instance, a CBA in
Detroit required an incoming Whole Foods to hire 70% of its workforce locally and to hang local
art within the store, to mention a few of the requirements. The community specifically acted in
this instance with a desire to maintain the sense of community ownership.116 Notably, these
agreements are usually e ectuated by local community groups, not the legislature. In fact, it is
likely that these agreements must be enacted by the community and not the local government
due to limits on the government’s power to force businesses to act in a way they desire. Critics
of legislatively mandated CBAs have noted that attempting to create such restrictions for
incoming businesses would more than likely lose a legal exactions battle.117
In the Opportunity Zone context, CBAs o er a contractual solution to the lack of local power in
land use decisions and the tax program itself to the community. Most favorably, an
Opportunity Fund that decides to implement a building project (instead of investing in an
existing enterprise) will work from the outset with the local community groups to reach a
mutually beneficial investment opportunity. This system of early bargaining can likely only be
accomplished in larger cities where community groups wield significant power and resources
to e ectively impact and coerce investors. Governors can help facilitate local leader’s impacts
by using their political power to connect fund managers with local interest groups. If the
groups can provide real investment value through local expertise or data research (or pose
enough of a litigation threat to be taken seriously), fund managers may be induced to view
their participation as necessary.
Though a potential fix that mitigates some of the relevant issues, there are critiques to using
CBAs to mandate change. For one, these agreements may lack appropriate representation of
all viewpoints of all people within a neighborhood.118 That is to say, CBAs in many ways
circumvent the democratic process by eliminating the local government’s influence and power
over regulation and instead further divide the decision making at a neighborhood level.

However, the reverse can also be argued. That is to say, it can be said that local governments
(and apparently the federal government) have long been influenced unduly by private
development or, alternatively, that businesses are taking advantage of the local planning
process. CBAs instead “bring those groups that have traditionally been on the fringes of the
development process into the discussion,” and check the local decision-makers biases.119

G. CREATE A STRATEGY FOR INVESTMENT FOR THE COMMUNITY
Researchers at the Urban Institute suggest “diagnos[ing] neighborhood types and match[ing]
strategies accordingly.”120 At its core, this suggestion places the burden on local stakeholders
to cra a strategy document for development in the city. Theoretically, this would have the
community conduct some sort of market analysis to evaluate current capital investments or
lack thereof to funnel investment to the neediest places whilst guarding against investment in
gentrifying areas.121 Again, this idea is conceptually strong but is likely most useful in
application in larger cities that possess su icient local government relations with their
philanthropic stakeholders. Funding and resources are also hurdles for smaller localities who
might wish to conduct such a study. Though in some ways more administrable than prior
suggestions, an easily accessible strategic plan reduces the need for direct interaction between
the funds and locals. Instead, freely distributing such information to funds in advance of their
decision-making not only reduces the costs of entry (by reducing the research costs), it also can
provide a strong incentive to follow the community’s suggestions. This, combined with CBAs
which place coercive pressure on developers to listen to the community for fear of litigation or
delays in the process, can likely prove successful.
Likewise, cities can leverage existing incentives by shi ing Tax Increment Financing Districts122
or encouraging investment by layering relevant Zones with other tax incentives such as the
New Markets Tax Credits and municipal bonds.123 While undoubtably o ering greater financial
incentives will draw in investments, it is unclear why a city should do this. Opportunity Zones
already o er an unparalleled tax credit to historic programs; it is unclear why fighting for more
capital investment will protect the communities any more than at the outset. If a locality is
truly concerned with gentrification and the potential abuses stemming from unrestricted
development, simply creating more incentives for more money to funnel in (still without
guardrails) will exacerbate the problem.

H. SOLUTIONS FOR CHARLOTTESVILLE
With the revelation of issues within the Charlottesville designated tracts, it is useful to attempt
to apply the slate of suggestions previously provided. The solution for federal accountability
measures will be disregarded as it is not an implementation solution for a locality specifically.
Instead, the first solution is to use state land to accomplish a specific goal. As the selected
Zones in Charlottesville are primarily urban, it is unclear what, if any, state land might exist
within these areas. However, should land exist, it is likely that a ordable housing would be a
wise policy choice to pursue here.
Land use controls is a more obvious solution for Charlottesville. The Charlottesville and
Albemarle Planning Commissions, respectively, are active bodies that implement the
comprehensive plans when faced with variance, special exceptions, and permit applications.
These two bodies (the Albemarle Planning Commission govern Zones A and C and
Charlottesville Planning Commission governs Zone B) can have a significant impact upon what
types of development occur. That is to say, the Commissions can implement a preference for
projects that will benefit and not harm the low-income communities, ensure residents are
aware of any incoming development and have a chance to voice their concerns, and expedite
projects with preferable intentions.
Third, the local government can utilize stakeholders through creating a strategy for the
community. Charlottesville is specifically well-suited to create a comprehensive plan to
influence developers and solicit “useful” funds. In fact, Charlottesville is so well-suited to this
task particularly because it is a university town with great research capabilities and a host of
academics who may be willing to help. The city also has an incredibly active community to
solicit input and feedback from. A theoretical framework to begin this work first includes
speaking to residents of the Zones themselves to determine what the communities are
missing. For instance, perhaps a community would prefer neighborhood markets to a large
grocery store. Or, perhaps they need more low-income apartments over a ordable homes for
sale.
Part of what has made the current Habitat for Humanity project so interesting is that in their
prior mobile home park redevelopment, they held multiple meetings to gauge what the
residents wanted before making changes. They are conducting the same process with
Southwood. One Habitat for Humanity employee said, “They set the vision… They (the

residents) actually learned and were trained in architecture, engineering, and financing. Our
goal was to stand back and support the residents as they made a plan of development.”124
Initially speaking with the community to gauge support and need will be infinitely more vital to
a successful investment plan than using data alone. A second suggested step is to speak with
stakeholders such as Habitat for Humanity or the local business association so multiple
perspectives are represented. Finally, any plan created should focus on communicating
specifically tailored information to developers. Hence, this should not be an academic report
nor geared to the residents themselves. Instead, the information should be specific to concerns
of investors and fund managers and must include an analysis of the financial data that will
persuade them to invest in the manner suggested. It is also encouraged that information
regarding a group or groups best suited to negotiate a CBA be included at this stage to
encourage the funds to initiate contact.
Should such a plan be created in conjunction with local groups, these entities will be perfectly
set up to negotiate a CBA. That is, the plan, though created for developers, gives local groups a
starting point to advocate for specific forms of development as well as to provide data to
support their claims. Ideally, a complementary guide would be created in conjunction with the
development plan that gives suggestions for what provisions of a CBA would be most
beneficial to each individual project. For example, say a neighborhood desperately needs a
grocery store. Is it most beneficial to the community at large to have a CBA with local hiring
requirements? Or, should the CBA negotiate for a fresh fruits and vegetables section with
a ordable pricing? Perhaps, instead, the local art requirement from the Detroit CBA would
create a positive impact for the community-at-large. When interviewing local residents as to
their needs, this is an ideal opportunity to ask such questions and simultaneously cra plans
for both fund managers and the local community. In this way, the local government can funnel
development to optimize success. Utilizing the university’s research not only reduces research
costs but also provides a third-party check. Presumably, academics will not be as heavily
influenced by the desire to increase the tax base and instead focused more on the objectives of
the program.

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, both the structural critiques and implementation of this program creates
systematic ine iciencies resulting in a greater expenditure of funds than necessary. Whatever
the arguable benefit is to place-based subsidy programs that incentivize private actors to assist
in state goals, certainly a program such as this with so little criteria to incentivize actions for the
general good is problematic. In one sense the program is critiqued because it ties its selections
to income levels of people but is intended to revitalize space. That paradox in and of itself has
created strange Zone selections, such as Zone A in Charlottesville that has no need for more
unchecked investment. This is true of any gentrifying area, lending credence to other’s
arguments that place-based subsidies exacerbate gentrification. In another sense the program
is critiqued because the investments themselves have no limitations as to mode or ends. If this
program was indeed designed to alleviate poverty and improve the lives of residents, it must
have some, any, sort of limitations to ensure benefit is conferred on residents.
Finally, the available remedies and mitigation tactics available to state or local legislature and
stakeholders are imperfect but can help capitalize on the federal government’s expenditure of
funds. The suggestions discussed should be evaluated carefully to assess which strategy or
strategies will be most successful in a given locality. Certainly, some pose higher administrative
planning costs that may prove infeasible. Any extra expenditure of funds must include a cost
benefit analysis to ensure the loss of tax basis will result in a greater overall good. Secondly,
any additional incentives should be accompanied by investment guidelines that promote the
flowing of funds to meet identifiable state or local goals relevant to the census tract. Ideally,
these goals would be cra ed in conjunction and with the participation of the residents
themselves. Finally, in terms of local planning to assist this program’s e ectiveness, a major
takeaway from the Charlottesville case study is that local input and guidance is invaluable. Not
only does it reduce pushback against development, but it creates wiser investment plans both
for the community and the investors.
Going forward, it is helpful to recognize that gentrification is potentially a real and substantial
externality of development programs. Even with the most benign justification for the
Opportunity Zone implementation, there are consequences to using private actors,
incentivizing development without guidance, and ine iciencies to this form of spending.
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